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RECENT DECISION
RECENT DECISION
PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION OF VICTIM-WITNESSES OF
SEX OFFENSES
The recent case of Binder v. State' reveals a problem in the adminis-
tration of criminal law which merits serious attention. In Binder, the
defendant was convicted of sodomy and sentenced to a term of two to
fourteen years in the Indiana State Prison, wholly upon the uncorrobo-
rated testimony of the "victim," a fifteen year old girl who had a history
of mental instability and moral depravity. The defendant had made a
motion to the court requesting that it order a psychiatric examination of
this sole witness against him to determine her capacity to tell the truth,
the result of the examination to be presented in evidence for the jury's
consideration. The trial court denied the motion, and on appeal the Su-
preme Court of Indiana affirmed the conviction and the denial of the de-
fendant's motion for psychiatric examination. Even the Supreme Court
recognized that its decision precluded the jury from hearing and utilizing
relevant information about the credibility of the witness and the possible
influence of sex-oriented psychiatric disturbances on her credibility.
PSYCHIc DISORDERS AND CREDIBILITY IN SEX OFFENSE CASES
Our adversary system of justice is based upon a fundamental belief
in the jury's ability to discover the truth despite conflicting testimony.
A serious obstacle, however, is presented to the fact-finding process
when a legally competent but mentally abnormal witness takes the stand.2
This difficulty is particularly serious in certain kinds of sex cases where
the uncorroborated testimony of the complaining witness is sufficient to
convict a defendant.3 The emotive impact of sex cases was recognized
long ago when Lord Chief Justice Hale wrote that rape "is an accusation
easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the
party accused, though never so innocent."4  The public's reaction to sex
1. Binder v. State, -Ind. -, 221 N.E.2d 886 (1967).
2. Mental abnormality is used to designate the class of psychobiological dis-
turbances not caused 'by any specific bodily organ. See Comment, Psychiatric Evaluation
of the Mentally Abnormal Witness, 59 YALE L.J. 1324 (1950) and G. ZILBOORG,
MIND, MEDICINE, AND MAN 51-65 (1943).
3. Indiana has long followed the non-corroboration rule. See Bramlett v. State,
227 Ind. 662, 87 N.E.2d 880 (1949) and Chesterfield v. State, 194 Ind. 282, 141 N.E.
632 (1924).
4. 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 635 (1736).
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charges has changed remarkably little in the past two hundred years.5
It is becoming increasingly well recognized that those who suffer
from certain kinds of psychoses or neuroses are especially prone to manu-
facturing a charge of a sex offense.6 Usually these false charges are not
based upon any overt desire to do harm to a given person. Instead, they
are often the product of deepseated personality disturbances.7 In their
book Handbook of Psychiatry, Overholser and Richmond discuss para-
noia, which, they explain, is a mental disorder that does not distort the
outward appearance of personality: "No matter how absurd or unfounded
the delusions, the person entertaining them is still able to appear normal
and to react in normal fashion to matters outside his delusional system."'
They explain the recognized interpretation of paranoia and its effect on
those who suffer from it in the following way:
[Paranoia is attributed to] some defect or deficiency in
the sexual sphere, and it is true, as all observers agree, that
sexual delusions are to be found in many, perhaps a majority,
of the cases of paranoia... Thus, men fear homosexual assaults,
or believe that other men accuse them of being 'fairies' or
perverts. Women believe themselves married to famous persons
or to have numerous lovers or to be the victims of sexual
persecution.9
The problem confronting our legal system is that the members of
the jury simply cannot be expected to recognize or evaluate the effect of
these psychic disorders when the seemingly normal witness appears be-
fore them. Professional diagnosis of these traits is often the only way
in which one can discover any abnormality. Dr. Overholser, a past presi-
dent of the American Psychiatric Association, states:
It is a further fact that in some of these cases [alleged sex
5. "Public sentiment seems inclined to believe a man guilty of any illicit sexual
offense he may be charged with, and it seems to matter little what his previous reputa-
tion has been." Roberts v. State, 106 Neb. 360, 183 N.W. 555, 557 (1921).
6. See 3 J. XIGMoRz, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 924a (1940) (hereinafter cited as
NVIGINORE) :
The unchaste (let us call it) mentality finds incidental but direct expression
in the narration of imaginary sex-incidents of which the narrator is the
heroin or victim. On the surface the narration is straightforward and con-
vincing. The real victim, however, too often in such cases is the innocent
man; for the respect and sympathy naturally felt by any tribunal for a
wronged female helps to give easy credit to such a plausible tale.
7. Dr. W. F. Lorenz in 3 WIG.NoRE § 924a: "We, who have extensive criminal
experience among the mentally ill, know how frequently sexual assault is charged or
claimed with nothing more substantial supporting this belief than an unrealized wish or
unconscious, deeply suppressed sex-longing or thwarting."
8. W. OVERHOLSER AND W. RICHMOND, HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 150 (1947).
9. Id. 152-53.
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offenses] the personality disturbance which lies at the basis of
the accusation would not be discernible to laymen, but that the
psychiatrist can in many cases give a definite opinion as to the
witness' mental state after he has made an examination.1"
Thus, unless the jury have been aided by the opinion evidence of a psy-
chiatrist who has personally examined the complaining witness in a sex
case, they might well make a determination of defendant's guilt incog-
nizant of any possibility that the complaining and sole witness to the
offense charged suffers from a mental disorder or of what form such a
disorder would assume. Whenever the entire case centers around credi-
bility (both of the prosecuting witness and the defendant), any aid to
the jury seems highly advisable.
A psychiatric examination with testimony by the psychiatrist con-
cerning the witness' mental capacity is presently the best tool to provide
such an aid to the jury. That a psychiatrist under proper circum-
stances is capable of fulfilling such a function cannot be seriously ques-
tioned. Dr. Henry A. Davidson makes the following comment:
If the psychiatrist were given all the facts about the wit-
ness' background; if he were given time to do a thorough phys-
ical and mental examination; if he could take a psychiatric his-
tory on the witness, he could give the trial lawyer a solid
opinion about testimonial capacity. 1
There have been many suggestions, however, that allowing a psy-
chiatrist to testify on the credibility of a witness would invade the
province of the jury, who alone are entrusted with the responsibility of
ascertaining the facts.' 2 Edwin Conrad offers a convincing response:
The argument that the use of such expert psychiatric testi-
mony does not fall within the traditional pattern of impeach-
ment implies that law is static and not flexible enough to meet
important developments in the field. Moreover, the credi-
bility of a witness never raises a collateral issue because credi-
bility is one of the main issues in any case. Since even insane
persons may be found to be competent as witnesses under the
relaxed modern rule, there should be a more liberal admission
of evidence relating to such witness' defective mental condition
10. W. OVERHOLSER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE LAW 54 (1953).
11. Davidson, Testimonial Capacity, 39 BOSTON U.L. REv. 172 (1959).
12. See State v. Walgraeve, 243 Ore. 328, 412 P.2d 23, reh. denied, 413 P.2d 609
(1966).
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as it affects his power to tell the truth.3
James Richardson, in his work on Scientific Evidence, agrees with
Conrad and makes the observation that:
[E]xperts can give credible evidence on the personality struc-
tures of individuals, including their propensities to prevaricate.
Further, such expert opinion does not invade the jury's province.
It serves a well-established function in an area where laymen
are uninformed, and the ultimate decision is with the jury. 4
That the jury is not intimidated by the testimony of the psychiatrist
and is indeed the finder of fact was vividly demonstrated in the Alger
Hiss case."5 There the government's case rested principally upon the
testimony of one witness, Whittaker Chambers. The defense was al-
lowed to submit in evidence psychiatric testimony on the issue of the
witness' credibility. This evidence indicated that the witness was a psy-
chopath with a tendency toward making false accusations. The jury
apparently found this testimony unconvincing and found the defendant
guilty. Many similar instances have occurred in the state courts.'
One valid objection to the use of psychiatric examinations, of com-
plaining witnesses is that such examinations are invasions of privacy.
Nevertheless it would seem that this objection is overcome by the need
for placing this testimony before the fact-finders.
[T]he individual's right to privacy is outweighed by the need
for getting at the truth, especially if the fate of the defendant
hangs in the balance. And if the witness is normal, his privacy
will remain intact... .
Professor Wigmore in his treatise on evidence gave specific atten-
tion to the problem of the mentally abnormal witness, and his research
lead him to declare:
No judge should ever let a sex-offense charge go to the
jury unless the female complainant's social history and mental
makeup have been examined and testified to by a qualified
physician.'"
13. Conrad, Psychiatric Lie Detection; The Federal Courts Break with Tradition,
21 F.R.D. 199, 215 (1957).
14. J. RICHARDSON, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 8.34 at 263 (1961).
15. United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
16. Cf. State v. Wesler 137 N.J.L. 311, 59 A.2d 834 (1948); People v. Cowles,
246 Mich. 429, 224 N.W. 387 (1929).
17. Comment, Psychiatric Evaluation of the Mentally Abnormal Witness, 59
YALE L.J. 1324, 1341 (1950).
18. 3 WIGMORE § 924a.
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INDIANA CASES
With the case of Burton v. State19 it appeared that Indiana was to be
among the first to follow Professor Wigmore's admonition. In that case
the defendant had been convicted of sodomy with his daughter. Her
testimony was completely uncorroborated and evidenced considerable
coaching by her mother. The court reversed the conviction on the
grounds of insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction, stating:
The prosecutrix was ten years old at the time she testified,
and without her testimony the charge was not proved under any
view. This record is wholly silent that the state took any steps
whatever to determine the prosecutrix was not a fantast," or
was not under the compelling domination of her mother. Since
the record is silent on this safeguard, we must presume the state
did not heed the warning contained in Dean Wigmore's treatise
on Evidence .... "
Thus, the Indiana Supreme Court made it clear in 1953 that there
should be an examination of the victim-witness, where guilt will turn up-
on her uncorroborated testimony since the chances of injustice are sub-
stantial. This chance is especially great in sex cases where the emotive
impact of the charge alone is strong and the uncorroborated testimony of
the complaining witness is sufficient for conviction of the defendant.
It is notable that the defendant in the Burton case never made a
formal motion for a court order directing examination of the prosecutrix.
The court, piercing any procedural problems, simply recognized that it is
often necessary and always highly desirable that the jury have the aid
of the psychiatrist when determining the witness' credibility, especially in
light of the character of the offense, the response it usually evokes, and
the difficulty of demonstrating the existence of psychic disorders negat-
ing credibility by the usual forms of impeachment.
In Wedmore v. State2 the defendant, charged with having carnal
knowledge of a female child under the age of sixteen years, was found
guilty of assault and battery. The facts substantiating the charge in this
case, however, were clearer than the facts in Burton. The prosecutrix
19. 232 Ind. 246, 111 N.E.2d 892 (1953).
20. "Pseudologica phantastica is a mixture of lies with imagination. Not in-
frequently, this is the basis of alleged sexual assault. Girls assert they have been
raped, sometimes recounting as true a story they have heard, falsely naming individuals
or describing them." Burton v. State, 232 Ind. 246, 251 n.2, 111 N.E.2d 892, 894 n.2
(1953).
21. Burton v. State, 232 Ind. 246, 250, 111 N.E.2d 892, 894 (1953). (Emphasis
added.).
22. 237 Ind. 212, 143 N.E.2d 649 (1957).
RIECENT DECISION.
complained to her sister-in-law on the morning after the alleged act, and
also told two friends of the incident." On appeal the defendant, as in
the Burton case, assigned as error the insufficiency of the evidence to
support the jury's verdict. As was true in the Burton case, no motion
had been made for a psychiatric examination of the victim-witness; and
on appeal the defendant relied upon Burton to assert that the state failed
in its duty because it did not present psychiatric evidence to prove her
credibility. The Court in Burton had stated clearly:
By this decision we do not hold that in every case where a
sexual offense is charged there should be a psychiatric examina-
tion of the prosecutrix. There are many cases where the
facts and circumstances leave no doubt of the guilt of the
accused .... 24
Nevertheless, the Court in Wedmore found it necessary to expressly
overrule Burton, stating:
In so far as Burton v. State, supra, (1953) 232 Ind. 246,
111 N.E.2d 892, purports to require that in any sex case the
complaining witness be required to be examined, before testify-
ing, by a psychiatrist for the purpose of examining her social
history and ascertaining her probable credibility, the report of
such examination to be presented in evidence, it is disapproved
and overruled. 5
The language of the Wedmore decision merely frees the State from
the affirmative duty of determining the credibility of the complaining
witness by a psychiatric examination as a condition precedent to estab-
lishing sufficient evidence for a conviction where the evidence of the
complaining witness is otherwise uncorroborated. Although the Wed-
,more decision is not nearly as liberal as Professor Wigmore's admonition
to judges, it is not unduly restrictive because the possibility is left open
for the defendant to request such an examination, the decision on this
matter resting within the discretion of the trial court.
If the court, within its sound discretion on request of the
defendant-appellant herein, had ordered such an examination
appellant would thereby have waived the right to object to the
23. Id. at 217, 143 N.E.2d at 651.
24. Burton v. State, 232 Ind. 246, 255, 111 N.E.2d 892, 896 (1953). This part of
the decision had been recognized and applied in Harvey v. State, 232 Ind. 574, 114
N.E.2d 457 (1953). In Harvey, no examination was ordered by the Court because of
the absence of any indication of abnormality and the presence of some corrobrating
evidence.
25. Wedmore v. State, 237 Ind. 212, 223, 143 N.E.2d 649, 654 (1957).
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report of the examining physician if it was adverse to him, and
at the same time he would have been given all the protection
against fantasy and fabrication on the part of the prosecuting
witness as proposed by Professor Wigmore."6
It is proper to note here that the Court in Wedinore placed no def-
inite limitation upon the extent of the trial court's discretion when a
motion for psychiatric examination is made by the defendant. In other
words, Wedmore permits the court to entertain a motion for psychiatric
examination for determining either the competency or credibility of the
witness-which is extremely important since the issues of credibility and
competency are separate and distinct. A witness is competent to testify
if the judge finds he is sensible to the obligations of an oath and has
sufficient powers of observation, recollection and communication to be
of aid to the jury in determining the truth."7  Vhether or not the witness
is competent to testify is determined solely by the court after minimal
inquiry and represents at best a very low threshold test.2" The issue of
credibility, on the other hand, is for the jury to decide. It amounts
simply to whether or not the jury will or can believe the testimony of a
given witness.29 Though separate and distinct, the close relationship
between the two issues is' obvious. Guttmacher and \,Veihofen have sug-
gested the following approach to the two issues:
Any doubt of the witness' competency should be resolved in
favor of letting him testify and letting the jury determine the
value of his testimony. 30
But it should always be open on the other side to present
evidence of mental abnormality (or any other trait) tending to
show that the witness' powers of observation, recollection, or
communication were not normal even though the defect may not
be so extreme as to render him wholly incompetent to testify.
31
The injustice which could flow from a confusion of the two concepts is
patent, especially in sex offense cases.
26. Id. at 224, 143 N.E2d at 654.
27. 58 Am. JuR. Witnesses § 102 (1948).
28. Modern relaxation of competency requirements for witnesses has in-
creased the need for psychiatry in the courtroom. Formerly the deranged
and defective were deemed incompetent. Today a sense of duty to speak the
truth and a bare minimum of ability to observe, remember and recount
qualify a witness to give testimony. As a consequence, more and more people
with personality disorders and defects now testify in criminal and civil
trials. Comment, supra note 2, at 1325.
29. 58 Am. JUR. Witnesses §§ 860, 862 (1948).
30. M. GUTTAACHER AND H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW, 362 (1952).
31. Id. 363.
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The Indiana Supreme Court again faced the issue of examining
the complaining witness in Lamar v. State, 2  in which the
defendant had been charged and convicted of sodomy upon the uncor-
roborated testimony of a fifteen year old boy. The case had been tried
without a jury. In contrast to Burton and Wedmore, the defendant had
made a motion to the court for a psychiatric examination of the com-
plaining witness. The defendant had been specific in his motion and
directed it toward the issue of competency."3 This motion was denied by
the trial court and the defendant appealed. The Supreme Court first ex-
plained that Wedmore overruled Burton thus not placing upon the State
the affirmative duty of examining the witness. The court then quoted
from the trial court to show that no error and hence no abuse of the
discretionary power mentioned in Wedmore had occurred in denying the
defendant's motion for a psychiatric examination of the complaining wit-
ness:
• . . In view of the motion made at the beginning of trial,
that the prosecuting witness be examined, the Court has paid
particular attention to the demeanor and the testimony of the
prosecuting witness and the Court is of the opinion that the
witness made a straightforward witness. .... "
Had the motion in Lamar sought a psychiatric examination of the wit-
ness on the issue of his credibility, in a jury trial, one might have argued
that the trial court could not rule on such a motion merely by itself ob-
serving the demeanor of the witness, for the determination of credibility
is a jury function. However, where the motion is directed toward com-
petency and the judge is the trier of fact, it is precisely within the judge's
discretion to determine if any examination is needed to aid the court in
performing its duty of determining the competency of the witness. It
would be difficult to find the judge had abused his discretion in such a
situation.
When the recent case of Binder v. State" came before the Indiana
Supreme Court, it appeared the proper set of facts had been presented
for granting a motion by the defendant to examine the prosecuting wit-
ness. The defendant was charged and convicted of sodomy. As related
32. 245 Ind. 104, 195 N.E.2d 98 (1964).
33. "Comes now the defendant, Loyce Lamar, and respectfully petitions the court
to order Roger Sitcler to submit to and undergo a psychiatric examination . . . and in
support of said petition says:
1. That said Roger Sitcler is mentally incompetent ... ." Brief for Appel-
lant at 7, Lamar v. State, 245 Ind. 104, 195 N.E.2d 98 (1964). (Emphasis added.).
34. 245 Ind. at 108, 195 N.E.2d at 100.
35. - Ind.- , 221 N.E.2d 886 (1967).
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in the vigorous dissenting opinion, the defendant made a motion at the
close of the State's case to have the prosecuting witness examined spe-
cifically with regard to her credibility as a witness. Her credibility was
clearly in doubt. She admitted on the stand that she had been having
sexual intercourse since the age of eleven; that she was a highly nervous
person; that she had received medical treatment for that condition prior
to the alleged offense; that she was undergoing such treatment at the
time of the trial; that she had been confined in the Juvenile Detention
Home; that she was then a resident of the Indiana Girls School; and that
a member of her family had been a patient at a state mental institution. 6
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court disregarded the fact that the motion
had been directed to the issue of credibility and ruled only on the issue
of competency, stating:
Appellant's motion was not timely filed and an objection to
the competency of a witness must be made before the witness is
permitted to testify. 7
Using the Wedmore case as authority, the court, in the last paragraph of
its opinion, declared:
On the issue of the right to a psychiatric examination in
cases involving sex crimes, we have more recently reaffirmed
our position taken in the Wedmore case, supra, by the opinion in
Lamar v. State . . 8
As noted, Wedmore and Lamar basically contain two points: that
the State is not required to have a psychiatrist examine the complaining
witness in sex cases as a condition precedent to her testifying at trial, and
that it is within the discretion of the trial court to order a psychiatric ex-
amination of the complaining witness on the issue of credibility upon the
defendant's request. Certainly the decision in Binder does not logically
follow from these two points, despite the court's insistence that Wedmore
and Lamar are the basis of its decision.
The door may not be altogether shut against psychiatric examina-
tions of prosecuting witnesses in sex cases, particularly where motion
is made by the defendant to probe the issue of credibility. That issue
was not directly ruled upon in Binder. Had the issues of competency and
credibility not been confused, the facts of Binder would have clearly jus-
tified a ruling that the trial court abused its discretion in not ordering a
psychiatric examination on the issue of credibility.
36. Id. at 890 (Dissenting opinion).
37. Id. at 887. (Emphasis added.).
38. Id.
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POWER OF COURTS TO ORDER EXAMINATIONS OF WITNESSES
The Indiana Supreme Court has indicated in Wedmore, Lamar, and
Binder a doubt of its power to order a psychiatric examination of a com-
plaining witness in a sex case in the absence of a statute so providing. In
the absence of a statute to the contrary, however, the Court's inherent
power would seemingly enable it to make such an order. The inherent
power of the trial courts to order psychiatric examinations of prosecuting
witnesses in sex offense cases has been recognized in several states, 9 and
the federal courts recognized a similar power in the trial of Alger Hiss
for treason.4" The New Jersey Court has held that because the trial court
unquestionably has jurisdiction over the witness when he is produced to
testify, it has power to compel the examination.4 The California Su-
preme Court has also acknowledged the power of the trial court:
Rather than formulate a fixed rule in this matter we believe
that discretion should repose in the trial judge to order a psy-
chiatric examination of the complaining witness in a case in-
volving a sex violation if the defendant presents a compelling
reason for such an examination.4
With respect to what criteria should be utilized in assessing when a suf-
ficiently cogent reason has been presented, the Court averred:
Such necessity would generally arise only if little or no
corroboration supported the charge and if the defense raised
the issue of the effect of the complaining witness' mental or
emotional condition upon her veracity.4"
Professor Wigmore has made the following comment on judicial power:
[T]he general judicial power itself, expressly allotted in every
State Constitution, implies inherently a power to investigate as
auxiliary to the power to decide; and the power to investigate
implies necessarily a power to summon and to question wit-
nesses. . ..
39. Cf. Ballard v. Superior Ct. of San Diego Co., 64 Cal. 2d 159, 410 P.2d 838,
49 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1966) ; People v. Kemp, 139 Cal. App. 48, 34 P.2d 502 (1934) ; State
v. Butler, 27 N.J. 560, 143 A.2d 530 (1958) ; State v. Klueber, 81 S.D. 223, 132 N.W.2d
847 (1965).
40. United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
41. State v. Butler, 27 N.J. 560, 143 A.2d 530 (1958).
42. Ballard v. Superior Ct. of San Diego Co., 64 Cal. 2d 159, 176, 410 P.2d 838,
849, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 313 (1966).
43. Id.
44. 9 WimioRE § 2484.
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One reason sustaining a belief that Indiana courts have the inherent
power to order the examination of a prosecuting witness in criminal trials
even in the absence of a statute is that Indiana courts have long recognized
an inherent power to order the physical examination of a party in civil
actions when timely demand is made by the defendant." The fact that
in criminal prosecutions the person to be examined is called a witness
instead of a party surely presents no real obstacle to the court's power;
nor does a psychiatric examination necessarily represent a greater inva-
sion of one's privacy than does an intimate physical examination.4 6 Sup-
pose a civil suit for seduction contrasted with a criminal prosecution for
rape of a minor child: in both cases the jury is presented with a situa-
tion where the victim and the defendant are the only witnesses. Certainly
the defendant's interest in the criminal case where deprivation of life or
liberty may result cannot be less than in a civil case. Yet, it is the civil
case where the courts have recognized their inherent power to grant a
physical examination of the individual making the accusation. The
language of the New Jersey court is particularly apt:
The trial for a criminal cause is a quest for truth and
justice, not merely a contest for a tactical advantage over an
adversary or for a favorable verdict irrespective of its relation
to the basic objective of the proceedings. When reasonable
grounds for doubt as to a person's mental capacity become
known to the parties and to the court and lives may depend up-
on his testimony, the proper administration of justice in the
public interest ought to stimulate a cooperative voluntary effort
to establish a means of mutual solution of the problem."
Granting that the trial court lacks power to compel a witness to sub-
mit to a psychiatric examination, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has de-
veloped an alternative method for securing the interest of the defendant.
In Wisconsin the judge can, in the exercise of his sound discretion, order
the witness to submit to a psychiatric examination as a condition of al-
lowing the witness to testify. 8 The Indiana courts could profitably use
such an approach.
45. See South Bend v. Turner, 156 Ind. 418, 60 N.E. 271 (1901); and Valparaiso
v. Kinney, 75 Ind. App. 660, 131 N.E. 237 (1921).
46. In Templin v. Erekedis, 119 Ind. App. 171, 84 N.E.2d 728 (1948), it was
ruled error not to order the physical examination of the plaintiff charging a physican
with malpractice for rupturing her hymen during his examination of her as a patient.
Clearly an order for a psychiatric examination in a criminal case should not require
more power than an order in a civil case to make the intimate determination of
whether the hymen is intact.
47. State v. Butler, 27 N.J. 560, 599-600, 143 A.2d 530, 553 (1958).
48. State v. Miller, 35 Wis. 2d 454, 151 N.W.2d 157 (1957) ; Goodwin v. State
114 Wis. 318, 90 N.W. 170 (1902).
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If the Indiana Supreme Court is truly concerned about the problem
of power to order a witness to submit to a psychiatric examination and
yet wants to protect the defendant from the dangers outlined by Profes-
sor Wigmore, it might well re-examine the approach taken in Burton. A
rule increasing the requirement for evidence sufficient to sustain a con-
viction could easily get around the power problem and protect the de-
fendant.
Indiana needs an enlightened rule that will protect the defendant
against the false charges of a mentally abnormal witness. Because of
the hazy application of Wedinore in the Binder decision, the law in In-
diana is not clear. The Court first re-affirmed /edmore, and, neces-
sarily, its approval of the discretion of the trial court to order an ex-
amination, and then it denied the motion for such an examination with
language that implies no examination is possible. When this issue is
again presented to the Indiana Supreme Court, it must at least make its
position clear. The more enlightened rule would permit the defendant to
examine the prosecuting witness and submit to the jury evidence of the
witness' incapacity for telling the truth.
Edward L. Volk
